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ABSTRACT 
The ability to assess the reputation of a member in a web community is a need addressed in many 
different ways according to the many different stages in which the nature of communities has evolved 
over time. In the case of reputation of goods/services suppliers, the solutions available to prevent the 
feedback abuse are generally reliable but centralized under the control of few big Internet companies. In 
this paper we show how a decentralized and distributed feedback management system can be built on top 
of the Bitcoin blockchain. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability to assess the reputation of a member in a web community is an essential need that 
arose since the web was born. This concept took several different forms according to the 
different stages in which the nature of web communities and participation in digital life have 
evolved over time. Notable examples are: the rank of a forum member assigned according to the 
volume of messages and replies provided in systems like bulletin boards; the reputation gained 
by sellers and buyers in e-commerce communities like eBay which is in turn based on the 
feedback they provide each other after the conclusion of a commercial transaction. The last 
reification of the concept of “web community reputation” is related to social networks. This 
incarnation is now more pervasive than ever because the adoption of social networks is now 
mainstream among people of any kind, of any age, and of any cultural background. The number 
of like(s) in a Facebook page, or the followers of a Twitter profile are commonly accepted as 
success indicators of a person, a group, a project, or an organization. This success indicator is 
often considered an asset or even a credential to better position the popularity even in traditional 
media because TV programs and newspapers often relaunch news and gossip directly from 
social media monitoring the users that they consider trend makers. Even politicians have 
discovered the positive network effect of gaining visibility and thus reputation in social media 
up to the point that a market for fake-like or fake followers is now very profitable [1]. 
In the case of reputation of goods/services suppliers, another important factor comes into play 
and this factor is money.  So a web community like eBay must handle with great care the 
reputation score of sellers and find countermeasures against the false transactions and false 
identities created with the malicious purpose to falsely enhance the reputation of an actor by 
means of non-genuine feedback. The solutions implemented on major buyer/seller platforms to 
prevent this kind of abuse on the reputation mechanism can be assumed as reliable “enough”. 
The meaning of  "enough" comes to the fact that brokerage platforms have a big interest in 
increasing and maintaining their own reputation. A site like eBay has strong interest in 
implementing robust and fair reputation and trust mechanisms therefore tends to prohibit or 
limit any abuse. They have in principle no interest in falsifying the values of reputation of the 
participants and if they promote one of them despite its reputation they make it through some 
advertisement placement.  
One practical and informal proof of the robustness of such feedback systems is in the fact they 
are still there and used by millions of users. It would therefore seem unnecessary to study new 
forms of feedback management beyond those implemented and deployed by big Internet 
companies, but we claim that is indeed necessary. The recent NSA scandal has shown how there 
has been excessive interference by national authorities in the operations of such big companies. 
It is likely that national interests of a dominant country could influence and control operations 
behind the scenes and may distort the reputations of participants of major trade/consumer 
platforms, for instance helping companies operating in one country at the expense of foreigner 
companies depending on the actual international politic conflicts. This is not a new concern, in 
the past it was discussed how a pervasive search engine like Google could be neutral and fair 
according to different geographical, political, racial interests [2][3] 
In this paper we are going to illustrate that the enablers for decentralized feedback management 
already exist and are at once global, decentralized and secure. However, the main claim of this 
paper is that such enabling technologies not only exist, but they are already deployed and 
running, even if are actually not aimed at the specific objective of global reputation 
management. 
In more analytic terms, we here assume the reputation as a numerical variable associated to an 
actor and, as compulsory requirement, its value is agreed by everyone and cannot be 
counterfeited by anyone. We can realize that these are, among the others, the same requirements 
of electronic money. Thus, given such equivalence, in a bijective proof, once we have a money 
management that is in turn global, decentralized, and secure we will also have a reputation 
management system with the same properties. Nowadays, we already have a system that meets 
the above requirements: the crypto-currency concept and Bitcoin is the most notable 
implementation. This digital currency is based on a chain of transactions replicated in thousands 
of nodes and unalterable thanks to state of the art cryptographic techniques. 
Adopting the Bitcoin block chain for purposes different than money transfer is not a novel 
concept. For instance Namecoin[4] is a Bitcoin fork able to work both as money and as 
decentralized name service. In[5] is described a Bitcoin-based approach to evaluate trusted third 
parties among certification authorities built-in in user client software. In[6] is described a 
method to manage anonymous credentials based on the concept of “general distributed ledger” 
introduced by Bitcoin removing the need for a trusted credential issuer. 
2. REPUTATION MODEL 
In the field of incentive based feedback has been showed that incentive based mechanisms can 
have their equilibrium in honest reporting having truth-telling as a Nash equilibrium [7]. 
Unfortunately incentive based feedback can have also not truth-telling equilibrium, in [8] is 
reported a collusion-resistant system for incentive based reputation system. The model 
presented in our paper is not formally proved to be collusion resistant, but it is reasonably robust 
to be compared to feedback systems running on existing platform like eBay. 
In the following sections, we illustrate how this model can be implemented on top of the Bitcoin 
protocol. As first step we define some concepts: 
Service S: a service produced and consumed online.  For instance a Web service API to 
transcode a video. 
SLA Service Level Agreement, a digital document that describe what a service does and with 
which contractual obligations (e.g. get a response within a maximum time limit) 
Consumer:  the consumer of service S. 
Producer: the producer of service S  
Payment P: a money transaction, an amount is transferred from a participant to another. Here we 
assume a payment P is securely linked to a service S. 
Voucher V: a voucher is transaction linked to a past payment P. A voucher must contain an 
amount of money called the vote fee equal to a percentage (e.g. 3%) of the payment P and 
optionally can contain an additional amount called the incentive.  
The important concept behind the Voucher is that both parties must digitally sign it.  
 
Fig.1 - workflow diagram. The consumer orders a service, performs the payment and if satisfied 
then decides whether or not to accept the incentive in the voucher leaving a positive feedback. 
Having a voucher transaction completed is equivalent to logically increment the reputation for 
that service. The actual reputation for a service is equal to the sum of voting fees for that 
service. 
3. SCENARIO 
The BPM diagram for this scenario is visible in Fig. 1. Consumer pays 0.1 units to Producer for 
accessing 1000 non-concurrent invocations of a video transcoding API and each execution must 
complete within 5 minutes. The Producer builds also a Voucher transaction with a voting fee of 
0.003 units and an incentive of 0.01 units and transmits the Voucher to Consumer to be co-
signed. 
If Producer complies with the contract then Consumer has two choices: 
Consumer signs together with Producer the Voucher, this means validating the execution of the 
contract. 
Consumer is not interested in the incentive. He does not co-sign the voucher. 
In the case (1) the reputation of service S, and therefore the overall reputation of the Producer, 
increments by 0.003 (the voting fee). Otherwise (2) nothing happens to the actual reputation.. 
4. DISCUSSION ABOUT THE REPUTATION MODEL 
The model proposed is quite simple, but in our opinion comparable with feedback systems 
actually implemented in main buyers/sellers community platforms sites. Here in this paper we 
are not proving the collusion-robustness of this model for incentive-based reputation 
management, but that such model even with its limitation, can be decentralized on existing 
Bitcoin infrastructure and running protocols without modification and without the need to fork 
the Bitcoin source tree to generate an alternative coin. This claim will be better explained in the 
rest of the paper. Here follows some qualitative properties and some issues related to the 
proposed model. 
 
4.1. Sybil Attack 
A producer may try to pump up his reputation using fake identities and assigning to them 
vouchers to vote. Given a voting fee for the transaction exists and is greater than zero, this 
attempt would result in expenditure for the producer more or less equivalent to advertise 
products. So he can climb the reputation slope not faster the amount of money he can afford. 
Thus the fraud is mitigated but this is still an issue, in fact reputation and advertisement are two 
different concepts that should not be mixed. The reputation should be a process incentivised but 
based on the sincere opinion of a consuming party about a product. A solution to further 
mitigate this attack is to calculate the reputation with a weighted sum, in other words gaining 
more reputation from peers that in turn have a good reputation and less from peers with low 
reputation. 
 
4.2. Free Services 
An opposite issue affects free services. According to the model presented in the previous 
section, if a service is free so happens that the voting fee would be zero and hence the reputation 
would always be zero. This is an undesirable side effect because even a free service should be 
able to have a reputation. To overcome this problem we may assume that a minimum fee could 
always be included also for free services, but here stands the dilemma of a service provider to 
afford such fees to gain reputation on a free service. 
 
4.3. Mirror for the lark 
Given that each voucher spent increases the service ‘s reputation by a fraction of the cost, a 
producer may gain high reputation with a few expensive products, and have an advantage with 
respect to competitors in selling low cost services. This really could happen only at the 
beginning of the life of one of the products, and then since it is possible to recalculate the 
reputation of every single service, then after a short amount of time it will be clear which 
products of a well-reputed producer are products with low reputation. 
 
4.4. Unhappy but vote 
A consumer may decide to take the incentive even if it is not really satisfied with the service S. 
He may eventually bring to arbitrage the case and try to get back the money of payment P. But 
as consequence of having signed and received the incentive he has de-facto validated the 
execution of the contract, thus his claim should not be taken into further consideration. The 
action of spending a voucher is a check-proof with timestamp and success acknowledgement. 
This consequence would discourage consumers from participating with the only objective to 
monetize the incentive. 
 
5. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES 
Bitcoin protocol addresses the byzantine generals’ problem [9]. In this problem the fact that 
every actor can write on a shared memory my produce an entangled set of conflicting assertions. 
The original problem has been formally proved to have no practical solution but in the 
subsequent works was conceived the concept of Byzantine fault tolerance and practical 
Byzantine fault tolerance [10]. Bitcoin is one of the modern implementation of the concept. It 
assumes that the cost of “writing” is not zero and the write access right is acquired after a proof-
of-work. This proof-of-work is derived from the hashcash algorithm [11] and as final result, 
logically allows only one actor at time to “lock” the ledger and write. Details are available here 
[12]. The ledger in the Bitcoin terminology is a replicated log of transactions called the block 
chain. Transactions are collected in blocks and blocks are appended according to the proof-of-
work algorithm mentioned above. In fig. 2 is showed a transaction. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2  The simplest Bitcoin transaction. In the example, an amount of 0.4 is transferred from an 
address “Alice” to an address “Bob”. The input comes from a previous transaction to Alice. 
Notice that an amount of 0.599 is sent back to Alice as change. The 0.001 unassigned is an 
amount that the node solving the proof-of-work can assign to itself as transaction fee. 
 
Each transaction is signed with the private key of the owner of a coin; in general a transaction 
may have many inputs, many outputs, and be co-signed by many private keys. In the simplest 
use case of one-to-one payments, a transaction has a single input and in general two output: the 
first output is to the Bitcoin address of the recipient (a public key), the second is the change and 
directed to the Bitcoin address of the sender, a small amount should be left unassigned and this 
will become the transaction fee. 
In the next paragraph and Fig. 4 we show how it is possible to implement the use case described 
in the previous sections without adding any new feature to the existing Bitcoin protocol. 
 
6. BITCOIN-BASED FEEDBACK SYSTEM 
Lets now assume the service S is identified by its own URL, eg. S := http://foo.bar. Lets also 
redefine all the concepts already defined in previous sections but now enriched with 
implementation details directly related to the Bitcoin protocol. We define Payment P a money 
transaction in BTC where an amount is transferred from a Bitcoin address to another. Double 
spending is prevented by the nature of Bitcoin block chain. Here we need a way to 
cryptographically link the payment P to a service S. This link is realized generating a correct 
Bitcoin address starting from the hash of the URL of S and sending 0.0 BTC to such address. 
With this trick, the zero-valued monetary transaction is also bound to the service URL. A tool to 
check if a generated address is a valid Bitcoin  address is available online at [13]. A similar 
approach is used in [14] which provides an online notary service to prove the existence of a 
document at a given time. To generate such syntax checked but fake Bitcoin address, we 
compute the ripemd160 [15] hash, a stronger version of RIPEMD, of S. The steps to generate a 
valid Bitcoin addres tied to a free form text are visible in Fig. 3. Lets call this address S*. Given 
that Bitcoin addresses contain a built-in check code; it's generally not possible to send Bitcoins 
to a mistyped or malformed address [16].  
Lets now define the Voucher V as a transaction linked to a past payment P. A voucher 
must contain an amount of money, called the vote fee, equal to a percentage (e.g. 3%) of the 
payment P and optionally can contain an additional amount called the incentive. The important 
concept behind the Voucher is that both parties (the buyer and the seller) must sign it digitally. 
Only when this condition is met, the Voucher will become a valid transaction eligible to be 
inserted in the block chain. The vote fee is merely the amount of the voucher not directly 
connected to a recipient, as in Bitcoin, if a coin has a part unspent this part become “transaction 
fee” and will be taken by the fastest node solving the current proof-of-work. The probability 
that the producer will be also the node getting the voting fee is assumed negligible in a 
populated network. As side effect of having a “voting fee”, quite palatable if compared with 
normal Bitcoin transaction fees, is that nodes involved in proof-of-work are also incentivised to 
seek such reputation transactions as a valuable source of income. Having a voucher transaction 
completed is equivalent to logically increment the reputation for that service. Traversing the 
block chain is possible to reconstruct the actual reputation for a service, which is equal to the 
sum of voting fees for those services. 
Summarizing (see Fig. 4), the consumer builds and signs a transaction P with 3 outputs:  
• Out1 is the cost of the service (0.1BTC) and directed to the producer 
• Out2 is 0.0 and directed to S* 
• Out3 is the change and redirected to the consumer 
 
 
Fig. 3 In this figure, the (9) is a valid Bitcoin address generated starting from a RIPEMD160 
hash (3) of the URL http://foo.bar 
 
Notice that the Out2 is useless as money transfer but it is a trick that allows to cryptographically 
establish a link between the transaction P and the service S. Moreover, if the sum directed to 
Out2 was greater than zero, this coin would be permanently destroyed from the p2p network 
because the recipient address is a formally valid address but no one has the private key to spend 
that coin. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the payment transaction cryptographically linked to the hash 
of serviceID, together with the voucher transaction signed by both parties1, is the combination 
of Bitcoin transaction that marks the increase of actual reputation score for the producer. 
 
 
Fig. 4 – On the left side the payment transaction cryptographically linked to the hash of 
serviceID, on the right the voucher transaction signed by both parties and used to increase the 
actual reputation value for the producer. 
 
Notice that the computation of the actual reputation is not part of the block chain protocol; it can 
be performed by third party applications that traverse the block chain and may provide different 
formulas to compute the reputation 
 
7.  REQUIREMENT FOR A DECENTRALIZED REPUTATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
In [17] are enumerated a list of requirements for a distributed and decentralized reputation 
management system. We decided to adopt these requirements as a benchmark of our reputation 
model. Here follows a discussion about each of the mentioned requirements. 
“The system should be self-policing. Policies are defined and enforced by the peers 
themselves and not by some central authority.” 
 
Having the system based on a crypto currency, it is not vulnerable to single point of failure. This 
assertion is as true as the proof-of-work capacity is distributed throughout the network. Having 
a single powerful actor able to close an important fraction of the total transaction blocks may 
cause the network to be attacked forging for instance a secondary head in the block chain. 
                                                
1 Technically speaking, a multisigned transaction is a transaction from a multisigned address. In this particular case 
would be a 2 out of 2 multisigned address. Details are not explained here for sake of clarity 
Nevertheless, the Bitcoin protocol is a money transaction protocol and in such cases the real 
damage would not be in the falsified reputation of parties, but in the destruction of the monetary 
value of the coins because some actors will become able to perform double spending, and 
finally in the collapse of all the Bitcoin network. The informal proof is that the block chain still 
stands after four year of operations. 
“The system should maintain anonymity” 
Anonymity is not a must-have requirement for the Bitcoin protocol. In fact, a Bitcoin 
transaction may be considered as anonymous as exchanging physical notes in a crowded square. 
The block chain is a “public place”, inside every transaction it is possible to locate the Bitcoin 
address of whom receives a coin. The address is usually in a form like: 
 
15VjRaDX3zpbA8PVnbrCAFzrVxN7ixHQ2C 
 
Thus in principle it is like an unknown face in a public square with the main difference 
that everyone can take this address and can try to harvest some information using web search 
engines. For instance, if Alice uses this address to receive donations in a web forum then it 
would be easy for an attacker to associate a real identity to a Bitcoin address. Thus, the 
anonymity is guaranteed as long as users does not leak relevant information that can be used to 
associate their identity to a Bitcoin address. 
“ The system should not assign any profit to newcomers. That is, reputation should 
be obtained by consistent good behavior through several transactions, and it should 
not be advantageous for malicious peers with poor reputations to continuously 
change their opaque identifiers to obtain newcomers status.” 
In the model presented in this paper, the reputation starts with a value equal to zero and must be 
positive. The reputation is managed like money with the difference it is not possible to transfer a 
reputation to another actor. In the scenario described in the previous sections, the reputation is 
somehow bound to a URL. In such cases, if the Internet domain is transferred from an actor to 
another, also his reputation is transferred. 
“The system should have minimal overhead in terms of computation, 
infrastructure, storage, and message complexity.” 
The proposed approach has a minimal overhead because it is based on a distributed, 
decentralized infrastructure already running for monetary transactions. 
“ The system should be robust to malicious collectives of peers who know one 
another and attempt to collectively subvert the system” 
This feature comes directly from the Bitcoin design. If we assume a small community as a 
minor part of the whole p2p network, they have some chance to operate a malicious behavior. In 
the paper [18] is described a possible attack, nevertheless this does not affect the validity of 
transaction but would affect the confidence of peers about the fairness of block solving race. 
 
 
8.  CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES 
In this paper we present how an incentive based feedback model can be implemented on top of 
Bitcoin protocols and on top of the existing Bitcoin network without modifications in its core 
operations. Throughout the paper, we introduce the incentive mechanism assumed in this work 
and we discuss pros and cons of the model. Some notions required to understand how the 
transactions are managed in the Bitcoin protocol are also introduced to finally expose the main 
contribution of the paper which is to describe how the incentive based feedback is directly 
implementable on top of the Bitcoin network. 
The advantage of using a decentralized architecture without single point of control is to provide 
a feedback management system, which is in turn decentralized, secure and global. The proposed 
solution is analyzed against the requirements exposed in [17] chosen as theoretical benchmark 
for a decentralized reputation management system. 
As stated in the paper, the proposed approach has some limitation that can be summarized as 
follows: 
• it is possible for the malicious user to build fake identities and use them to pump his 
own reputation. This undesirable effect is strongly mitigated by the fact that it is 
expensive because real coins need to be spent but it is somehow still an issue. 
•  According to the model presented in the previous sections, if a service is free so 
happens that the voting fee would be zero and hence the reputation would always be 
zero. This is an undesirable side effect because even a free service should be able to 
have a reputation. 
• The model presented is reasonably robust to be compared to existing online feedback 
systems but it is not formally proved to be collusion resistant.  
 
As final note, the blockchain is a new way to enable applications on top of cryptographic 
techniques. Bitcoin based payments is just the first and most notable application, but a lot more 
are likely to come. Currently, the image of Bitcoin as a currency is suffering some troubles 
because some important frauds and illicit behaviours have taken places during its recent and 
short life. The most notable is the recent bankruptcy of the MtGox exchange [19] which was the 
biggest and most visited site to buy/sell Bitcoins against fiat currencies. It may seem a paradox 
to design a reputation system on top of a technology that is experiencing a general lack of trust, 
but we claim that the technological advancement of the Bitcoin protocol are real, and even if his 
history will be sporadically affected by negative facts, the Bitcoin cannot be de-invented and it 
will likely pave the way to a new class of application. In this respect Bitcoin has been defined 
“not the money of internet but the internet of money”[20]. 
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